In an asymmetric tournament model with endogenous risk choice by the agents it is shown that equilibrium efforts decrease (increase) with risk if abilities are sufficiently similar (different). Risk also affects winning probabilities. The interaction of both effects is analyzed.
Introduction
Rank-order tournaments have been extensively discussed in labor economics, sports and other fields (see, e.g., Lazear and Rosen 1981; Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983) . In a tournament, agents compete against each other for given prizes that have been fixed in advance. When choosing their optimal efforts agents have to trade off an increased winning probability against a higher disutility of work. In practice, agents do not only choose efforts but have also to decide between more or less risky actions.
Previous literature has pointed at two effects when an endogenous choice of risk is considered: First, it has been claimed that in asymmetric tournaments agents with high abilities will prefer less risky actions to preserve their favorable positions, whereas agents with low abilities, who have nothing to lose, will prefer more risky actions to increase the likelihood of winning (e.g., Rosen 1988 , p. 84, referring to Bronars 1986 Knoeber and Thurman 1994, p. 158) . Second, in symmetric tournaments agents choose riskier strategies as a higher total variance of the outcome leads to lower equilibrium efforts and, therefore, lower costs (compare for instance Hvide 2000) .
We analyze a simple asymmetric tournament where the agents can determine the risk of their strategy on the first stage and their effort level on the second stage. As a first contribution, we show that it is no longer true in general that equilibrium efforts decrease in total variance. In contrast, if the ability difference is large enough, high risk will lead to low efforts: For high ability differences a higher risk tends to bring back the less able agent into the race and therefore raises overall incentives to exert effort which is of course bad from the agents' point of view. On the other hand, the above mentioned "likelihood" effect continues to be of importance. Whereas the agents' interests are aligned with respect to reducing equilibrium effort they are strongly opposed when the likelihood effect is considered. We study the interaction of both effects and characterized subgame perfect equilibria of the game.
Model and Results
We consider a two-stage tournament between the two risk neutral agents A and B. Agent i's (i = A, B) production function can be described by y i = a i + e i + ε i where a i denotes ability, e i effort and ε i an individual noise term. 1 ε A and ε B are assumed to be stochastically independent with agents compete for tournament prizes w 1 and w 2 with w 1 > w 2 ≥ 0. The prize spread w 1 − w 2 is denoted by ∆w. If y i > y j , agent i will receive the winner prize w 1 whereas agent j gets w 2 (i, j = A, B; i = j).
First we examine the tournament competition on the second stage. 2
Proposition 1 A pure strategy equilibrium on the second stage is symmetric. For given risk choices r i both agents exert the following effort level:
1 Alternatively, we could model heterogeneous agents by using different cost functions.
But the additive model has the advantage that we can interpret the ability difference also as an agent's lead in a homogeneous tournament.
2 For the existence of pure-strategy equilibria see the discussion in Lazear and Rosen (1981), p. 845, fn. 2; Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) .
3 Here φ (·) denotes the density of a standard normal distribution.
The effort is strictly increasing in ∆w and strictly decreasing in ∆a and c.
The effort is single peaked in σ 2 r i + σ 2 r j and highest at σ 2 r i + σ 2 r j = ∆a 2 .
Proof. On stage 2, agent i's objective function is given by u i (e i ) =
2 e 2 i with pr{y i > y j } = G (e i − e j + ∆a i ; r i , r j ) as i's probability of winning where G (·; r i , r j ) denotes the cdf of the composed random variable ε j − ε i which is again normally distributed with ε j − ε i ∼ N 0, σ 2 r 1 + σ 2 r 2 . Since G(·; r i , r j ) is symmetric, we have 1 − G(e i − e j + ∆a i ; r i , r j ) = G(−e i + e j − ∆a i ; r i , r j ) for agent j's winning probability. The first-order condition for agent i yields g (e i − e j + ∆a i ; r i , r j ) ∆w = ce i with
the left-hand sides of both agents' first-order conditions are identical which implies a symmetric equilibrium with e * (r i , r j ; ∆a) = g (∆a; r i , r j ) ∆w/c.
The last part is proved by substituting for the normal density and checking
Now we can go back to stage 1 and analyze the optimal risk choice by each agent. The variance affects the agents' efforts as well as their winning probabilities. We start by taking a closer look at the first aspect.
Lemma 1 For a given technology choice r j of the other player there exists a threshold level for the ability difference, ∆â, so that e
Proof. Compare,
which proves the first part of the lemma. To see that
L with k > 1 so that the inequality can be rewritten as
which is true as Ψ(1) = 0 and Ψ(k) monotonically increases for k > 1.
Lemma 1 describes the effort effect of risk taking. A riskier technology will reduce the equilibrium effort of both agents if and only if the ability difference ∆a is sufficiently small. For large values of ∆a a riskier technology increases the equilibrium effort of both agents. To understand this result on an intuitive level, suppose that the ability difference is very large and the risk of the technologies is low. In that case, the outcome of the tournament is largely determined by the abilities of both agents. On the one hand, the more able player knows that he will win the tournament with a high probability even with low effort. On the other hand, the less able player can affect his probability of winning only to a small extend. If the variance of the technologies increases, however, luck may compensate the ability difference which then will increase the impact of effort on the outcome of the tournament. This makes exerting effort more attractive for the low ability agent. That in turn forces the high ability agent to exert higher effort levels as well. For small values of ∆a the outcome of the tournament is less dependent on the abilities of the players but on effort. In such a situation, choosing a risky strategy decreases the influence of effort on the outcome. As in that way the marginal return of effort for both players is lowered, they both can commit to exert low efforts by selecting a high risk strategy.
On a more technical level, as we have seen in Proposition 1 there is a unique positive value for the total variance (namely ∆a 2 ) at which the equilibrium effort is maximized. Hence, depending on the values of σ 2 H and σ 2 L relative to ∆a either high risk choices or low risk choices by both agents minimize effort. If ∆a > ∆â (H) then ∆a will be sufficiently large relative to σ 2 H and σ 2 L . Therefore, effort will be minimized with a low risk choice by both. On the other hand, if ∆a < ∆â (L) then ∆a will be sufficiently small relative to σ 2 H and σ 2 L and effort will be minimized with a high risk choice by both. If ∆â (L) < ∆a < ∆â (H), however, the effort is highest if one player chooses a high risk, the other one a low risk strategy. Total effort is minimized when either both choose a high risk or a low risk strategy. If only considering the effort effect, the risk choices by both players are strategic complements. A coordination problem exists although both agents' interests are perfectly aligned.
As we have pointed out above risk taking influences as well each agent's probability of winning. This likelihood effect is characterized by Lemma 2:
Lemma 2 Player i's probability of winning will decrease (increase) in σ 2 r i + σ 2 r j if he is the agent with the higher (lower) ability. If both agents have the same ability, the winning probability will not be affected by risk.
Proof. We have G (∆a i ; r i , r j ) = Φ ∆a i / σ 2 r i + σ 2 r j with Φ(·) as the cdf of the standardized normal distribution. Letσ 2 = σ 2 r i + σ 2 r j and let σ 2 H >σ 2 L be two possible values ofσ 2 . As Φ(·) is monotonically increasing,
The winning probability of the agent with the higher ability decreases and that of the agent with the lower ability increases with total variance.
Hence, more able agents will prefer the less risky and less able agents the more risky technology if they only consider the probability of winning the tournament. Recall that when only considering the impact of the technology choice on the effort effect there is no conflict of interests between the two agents. If the ability difference ∆a is high they both will prefer a low risk, and when ∆a is low, they both want a high risk. However, when only the likelihood effect is considered there is a strong conflict of interests. The equilibrium outcome on stage 1 clearly depends on the relative importance of both effects.
For a given strategy r j player i will prefer a high risk to a low risk if
Hence, if there is no difference in abilities the equilibrium is straighforward: 4
Proposition 2 If ∆a = 0 both players always choose the risky strategy, i.e.
(r i , r j ) = (H, H). (ii) The proof proceeds analogously to (i).
(iii) If ∆w/c is sufficiently small, the likelihood effect will dominate the effort effect. The equilibrium then follows from Lemma 2. If ∆w/c is sufficiently large the effort effect will dominate the likelihood effect. In that case, we know from the discussion subsequent to Lemma 1 that there are two symmetric equilibria. 5
If ∆w/c is large, the costs of effort will be relatively small in comparison with the winner prize. Hence, both agents will exert a high effort to win the prize. In that case, the choice of technology is dominated by the concern to keep the equilibrium effort level as low as possible at the second stage and only the effort effect matters for the agents' decisions. As we have seen in Lemma 1, for small values of ∆a it will be beneficial for both agents to select high variances to limit the effort exerted, but for high values of ∆a the contrary is true. For intermediate values of ∆a, however, a coordination problem exists. If one agent chooses a more (less) risky strategy, the other one will prefer the same strategy since r i and r j are strategic complements in that respect.
If ∆w/c is small, the costs of effort will be high relative to the winner prize. Hence, both will not exert too much effort to win the tournament in any case. Therefore, risk choice is dominated by the likelihood effect. But
Lemma 2 gives us a clear cut result in that case. The high ability agent will prefer a low risk to safeguard his position. The low ability agent chooses a high risk as this helps him to challenge the high ability agent.
Conlusion
Our analysis has pointed at two important effects of risk taking in tournaments: On the one hand, it affects the equilibrium effort levels, on the other hand, the winning probabilities. As we have shown, the impact of risk on 5 Explicit cut-off values for ∆w/c for the three equilibrium types can be computed by rearranging inequality (1) for the different cases. Note that the cut-off values for the two symmetric equilibria will differ. If ∆w/c is larger than the highest of both cut-offs, the two symmetric equilibria will coexist.
effort levels crucially depends on the difference in abilities of both participants. Similar agents' efforts decrease in risk, but if talents are sufficiently different the opposite will hold.
